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Reconstructing the Meaning of Being 
“Montenegrin”
Jelena Džankić
The mushrooming number of states aft er the disintegration of multinational 
federations in Europe and Asia has revived the study of “building,” “construct-
ing,” or “imagining” national and ethnic identities. Similar to nationalism, 
which James Mayall identifi ed as a black box “into which whatever cannot 
be explained in any other way . . . can be fi led away without further consider-
ation,” nation building and national identities cannot be grasped by a single 
general theory.1 A more recent attempt at “deconstructing” the meaning of 
these concepts has been made by Rogers Brubaker, who criticized the clas-
sical approaches in the studies of nationalism and their use of the concept of 
identity.2 As an alternative to constructivism, which has become both a cliché 
and a dictum in the analysis of modern nations, Brubaker proposes an ana-
lytical paradigm whereby concepts like ethnicity or nation are viewed not as 
bounded groups but as “moments of collective eff ervescence”: moments of so-
cial organization.3 Understanding the impact of these moments on the creation 
of groups (which are by no means fi xed) unveils processes, frames, and catego-
ries through which ethnicity and nation are constantly reshaped from within.
Yet, while relying on Brubaker’s work, this article does not abandon 
the concept of identity and substitute it with identifi cation, as proposed by 
Brubaker and Frederick Cooper.4 Their rejection of the notion of identity is 
based on its heterogeneous use, which denotes a multiplicity of reifi cations 
of social relations into particular identities. As such, identities denote an 
end process and push the analysis toward essentialism, while identifi cation 
captures the transformation of social relations. Moving away from Brubaker 
and Cooper, my analysis does not view identity as a fi xed portrayal of the dy-
namic between individuals and society. Rather, in line with Brubaker’s later 
writings, identity, similar to ethnicity and nation, is a temporary represen-
tation of collectivity, a frame through which individuals ascribe themselves 
to groups.5 In this research, the use of identity is limited to the ethnic and 
national frames. This helps us to unveil how political entrepreneurs sought 
to reify the transforming social relations and how people situate themselves 
amid those transforming sociopolitical conditions.
The study of national revivals aft er the breakup of Yugoslavia provides 
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fertile empirical soil for applying and understanding this new approach to 
Brubaker’s model. The ways in which ethnicity and nation have been shaped 
in the post-Yugoslav space reveal that they are indeed not “things in the world” 
but “perspectives on the world.”6 The conception of the nation in Montenegro, 
a country of less than seven hundred thousand inhabitants and one of the 
newest post-Yugoslav states, has undergone signifi cant change. The politics 
and history of Montenegro in general have been studied by a mere handful of 
scholars outside the Balkan region, and only a few academic eff orts have dealt 
with national identity.7 This study fi lls this gap by looking exclusively at those 
policies that have had an impact on identity reconstruction in Montenegro. 
While not denigrating the signifi cance of historical analysis, references to the 
country’s history are made only if and when they became inseparable from 
policies. In other words, the analysis does not follow a historical logic or pres-
ent events and processes in the order in which they happened. Rather, in line 
with the conceptual background and methodological approach being used, I 
examine those issues which have proven to be salient for the reconstruction 
of Montenegrin identity.
In this context, it is important to note that between the time of the breakup 
of Yugoslavia, in the early 1990s, and mid-2006, Montenegro held two refer-
enda and three population censuses. Their results indicate a change in what 
it means to be “Montenegrin.”8 According to the 1991 census, 61.9 percent of 
the population considered themselves to be Montenegrins, 9.4 percent Serbs, 
and the remainder of various minorities.9 At the Montenegrin independence 
referendum held in March 1992, 95.4 percent of the 66 percent turnout voted 
for Montenegro to remain within a common state with other former Yugoslav 
republics wishing to do so.10 As ethnic minorities boycotted the 1992 referen-
dum, the above percentages indicate that in the early 1990s a majority among 
the population who fell under the Montenegrin category favored a joint state 
with Serbia rather than independent statehood.
The second referendum on independence, held on 21 May 2006, yielded 
quite diff erent results and is an indicator of the change in the content of the 
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2–24; Kenneth Morrison, Montenegro: A Modern History (London, 2009); Kenneth Mor-
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the state, the term citizen of Montenegro will be used.
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category of “Montenegrin.” Montenegrin independence was supported by 
55.5 percent of the 86.5 percent voter turnout and opposed by 44.5 percent.11 
Correlating these data with the results of the 2003 census, wherein 43.2 per-
cent of the people in Montenegro declared their national identity as Montene-
grin and 32 percent as Serb, we can infer a polarization of what was consid-
ered Montenegrin in the early 1990s.12 With minorities favoring independence 
in 2006, these data indicate that the lion’s share of the population who sup-
ported the preservation of the joint state defi ned themselves as Serb, and the 
majority of those who voted for independence as Montenegrins.13
The most recent census, conducted fi ve years aft er Montenegro became in-
dependent, revealed that the categories of Serb and Montenegrin, comprising 
28.7 percent and 45 percent of the population, respectively, have continued to 
be reshaped by the new political context.14 The aim of my research is to shed 
light on the changes in the meaning of Montenegrin identity and the mecha-
nisms through which such change has been catalyzed into the aforementioned 
“moments of collective eff ervescence.” The Serb category both in- and out-
side Montenegro was also signifi cantly nationalized during the period under 
scrutiny, but this complex issue falls beyond the scope of the present study. 
Examples of this process can be found in analyses of the confl icts in Croatia 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as in work on Serbian politics before and 
aft er Slobodan Milošević and in the more recent research on Montenegro.15
In turn, focusing on the smallest post-Yugoslav state, this article argues 
that despite the signifi cant changes in the content of Montenegrin identity, 
the policies that the government adopted within its nation-building project 
have proven only partly successful. To support this thesis, I examine popu-
lar support for the policies that have helped reconstruct Montenegrin identity 
aft er the disintegration of socialist Yugoslavia, focusing on the symbolic re-
construction of identity parameters in Montenegro aft er the split of the  ruling 
party in 1997. By examining original quantitative and qualitative data, my 
analysis associates the divide related to the question of statehood with percep-
tions of identity, showing how the content of “Montenegrin” self-identifi cation 
changed as a result of people’s support for or opposition to independence.
11. Centar za Demokratsku Tranziciju, Referendum, 21 May 2006, at www.cdtmn.org/
izbori/referendum06.php (last accessed 21 June 2006; no longer available).
12. Zavod za Statistiku Crne (Gore Statistical Offi  ce of Montenegro), “Population Cen-
sus 2003”, at www.monstat.org/eng/page.php?id=184&pageid=184 (last accessed 1 Febru-
ary 2014).
13. International Crisis Group, “Montenegro’s Referendum,” Europe Briefi ng, no. 42 
(30 March 2006), at www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/b042_montenegro_s_
referendum.pdf (last accessed 1 February 2014).
14. Zavod za Statistiku Crne Gore, “Population Census 2011,” at www.monstat.org/cg/
page.php?id=322&pageid=322 (last accessed 1 February 2014).
15. On the confl icts in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, see, for example, Valére 
Philip Gagnon, The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s (Ithaca, 2004), and 
Eric Gordy, The Culture of Power in Serbia: Nationalism and the Destruction of Alternatives 
(University Park, 1999). On Serbian politics, see Sabrina Ramet and Vjeran Pavlaković, 
eds., Serbia since 1989: Politics and Society under Milošević and Aft er (Seattle, 2005); Sa-
brina Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918–2005 (Bloom-
ington, 2006); and Bratislav Pantelić, “Memories of a Time Forgotten: The Myth of the Pe-
rennial Nation,” Nations and Nationalism 17, no. 2 (April 2011): 443–64. On this process in 
Montenegro, see again Roberts, Realm of the Black Mountain, and Morrison, Montenegro.
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The qualitative sources used, including conceptual and historical litera-
ture, newspaper articles, and legal texts, provide a contextualizing background 
for the empirical analysis, which is based on a survey conducted from 31 Au-
gust to 18 September 2011 as part of the project “Symbolic Nation-Building in 
the West Balkans.”16 The sample size for the Montenegro survey was 1,516 re-
spondents. While the survey dataset included a total of 89 questions, I pre sent 
here only those issues that have proven statistically relevant for the analysis 
of how policies adopted by the government changed Montenegrins’ identity 
frames.17 However, as with any quantitative dataset, the survey is not perfect; 
consequently, some issues cannot be examined in the present study. In par-
ticular, there is a lack of detailed analysis of non-Montenegrins and non-Serbs, 
as the only other ethnic category named in the survey were “Muslims” (which 
included those who identifi ed as Muslim and Bosniak). Due to the fact that Al-
banians and Croats in Montenegro form 5 percent and 1 percent, respectively, 
of the overall population, these groups were included separately in the Ipsos 
dataset but have been classifi ed under “Other.”18 Hence, a separate analysis of 
these minorities is not possible in this study and falls beyond its scope.
In terms of structure, the fi rst part of the article develops the framework 
for understanding nation building in this small post-Yugoslav state by viewing 
national identity as an abstract category. Here I draw on Brubaker’s concept 
of the schema, which is a cognitive frame through which individuals ascribe 
themselves to groups.19 Schemas consist of a core (which is less subject to 
change) and a periphery (composed of elements subject to alteration in dif-
ferent circumstances), and they provide tools helpful for understanding the 
cognition of the nation. The second part of the article is empirical, focusing 
on Montenegro’s nation-building policies. In viewing national identity as a 
political frame, I assess the success of policies aimed at nation building by ex-
amining popular support for them in the context of the offi  cial rhetoric of what 
the category of Montenegrin entails. This, however, does not imply a depar-
ture from Brubaker’s criticism of “groupism,” as the analyzed category is con-
sidered heterogeneous. Rather, my analysis supports the idea that concepts 
like nation and ethnicity can be understood only by looking at the framing of 
abstract cognitive categories through specifi c, institutionalized practices.
Understanding Nation Building in Montenegro
Nation building has long been a part of the major puzzle in social and politi-
cal studies. Nation building assumes an understanding of the ever-changing 
16. University of Oslo, Department of Literature, Area Studies and European Lan-
guages, “Strategies of Symbolic Nation-Building in West Balkan States,” at www.hf.uio.
no/ilos/english/research/projects/nation-w-balkan/ (last accessed 1 February 2014). Ip-
sos Strategic Marketing, “Report: Nation Building—Montenegro,” at www.hf.uio.no/ilos/
forskning/prosjekter/nation-w-balkan/dokumenter/nb_montenegro.pdf (last accessed 
1 February 2014).
17. The calculation of the statistical relevance is explained on page 5 of the report.
18. Ipsos Strategic Marketing, “Report: Nation Building—Montenegro,” 15.
19. Brubaker, Ethnicity without Groups; Brubaker, Loveman, and Stamatov, “Ethnic-
ity as Cognition.”
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conceptions of national identity in a given polity, be it a state, a state-like 
entity, or a subnational or supranational polity.20 National identity is best 
analyzed through two, partly overlapping, frames: cognitive and relational. 
First, national identity is cognitive and thus exists at the individual level. As 
such, it is related to the ways in which individuals realize their own national 
belonging and establish cognitive schemas. In turn, these schemas are essen-
tial for the self-ascription of the individuals to the perceived national group, 
whose boundaries are individually established and thus changeable. Second, 
national identity is endogenously and exogenously relational, in that it im-
plies the assumption of “groupness” among its members and the interaction 
of such a group as a collectivity with other groups.
Nation building is the process of harmonizing the boundaries of the 
state and those of national identity. It thus implies the framing of individual 
cognition as belonging to a perceived collective on the grounds of common-
alities such as language, culture, religion, and so on.21 At the same time, 
nation building presumes the creation of associative ties among the mem-
bers of the group (endogenous relationalism) and the diff erentiation of that 
group from others of the same kind by constructing cognitive boundaries 
acceptable to the individual members of a perceived nation (exogenous re-
lationalism). The interconnectedness of these processes can help explain 
nation building in Montenegro, where groupism has evolved over time. This 
process has taken place both at the individual level, whereby the cognitive 
understanding of the nation was altered, and at the level of the group, which 
has sought to materialize itself in various ways, changing its relations with 
other groups.
Nation Building through Alternating Cognitive Frames: 
Diff erent Cognitions of the Nation
Cognition of the nation in Montenegro has indisputably changed since 1991. 
During the wars of Yugoslavia’s disintegration (1991–96), Montenegro sided 
with Serbia, providing individuals with a cognitive frame for imagining and 
understanding the nation. Montenegrin nationalism fl ourished under the 
umbrella of Milošević’s politics, with only a small portion of the population 
demanding outright independence.22 The categories of Montenegrin and Ser-
bian in Montenegro were largely interchangeable and denoted belonging to 
the Montenegrin republic of Yugoslavia. Moreover, both of these categories 
were affi  liated with Orthodox Christianity.23 In the 1991 census, 72 percent of 
20. Alex J. Bellamy, The Formation of Croatian National Identity: A Centuries-Old 
Dream? (Manchester, 2003), 20–23.
21. Robert William Seton-Watson, The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans (New York, 
1966); Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (London, 1991).
22. Bieber, “Montenegrin Politics since the Disintegration of Yugoslavia,” in Bieber, 
ed., Montenegro in Transition, 21.
23. Miroljub Jevtić, “Uloga religije u identitetu južnoslovenskih nacija,” in Univerzitet 
u Beogradu Fakultet političkih nauka, Godišnjak 2008 (December 2008): 172; Veseljko 
Koprivica, “Religija na Balkanu, u znaku dualizma,” AIM Podgorica, at postjugo.fi lg.
uj.edu.pl/baza/texts_display.php?id=72 (last accessed 1 February 2014).
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the respondents (that is, the total of the two categories) declared themselves 
to be Orthodox Christians.24
In 1997 there was a disruption of the cognitive frame for understanding the 
meaning of being Montenegrin, one that can be attributed largely to the end of 
the republic’s monolithic political system. At that time, the ruling party of re-
formed communists—the Democratic Party of Socialists (Demokratska Partija 
Socijalista, DPS), which had captured most of the popular vote—split into two 
factions of almost equal size. Prime Minister Milo Đukanović discontinued 
the DPS’s support for Milošević, a move opposed by the then president of Mon-
tenegro, Momir Bulatović.25 Continuing to be politically linked to Milošević, 
in 1998 Bulatović established the Socialist People’s Party (Socijalistička naro-
dna partija, SNP), which has been the major opposition party in Montenegro 
ever since (apart from 2006 to 2009, when the Serbian People’s Party held 
one more seat in parliament than the SNP). Aft er the demise of the Milošević 
regime, in 2000, the internal Montenegrin debate needed a diff erent politi-
cal spin and thus provided another cognitive frame for nation building. The 
overall political discourse was marked by the Đukanović government’s inten-
sifi ed demands for independence. The confl ict among the political elites af-
fected the people of Montenegro, who gradually embraced the ideas professed 
by the DPS or the SNP. As a result, internal political struggles progressively 
generated two opposing political stances: pro-independence and pro-union. 
By the 2003 census, Montenegrin and Serbian schemas had become defi ned 
by political agendas and tied to the debate over Montenegrin statehood. The 
Serb category in Montenegro became related to Serb Orthodox Christianity, 
the joint state with Serbia, and opposition to Đukanović. The Montenegrin 
identity category was linked to support for independence and what were per-
ceived as western values, like pro-democracy rhetoric and European Union 
integration. The Montenegrin category also lost its religious appeal because 
the category now included religious minorities.
This marriage of ethnicity and politics became embodied in two compet-
ing national identities, with nationalization of the identity schema(s) at the 
heart of the processes described above. This shift ed the cognitive frame of 
national identity, allowing people to ascribe themselves to one with an alter-
nate label, thus enabling changes in the contents of the Montenegrin and Serb 
identity categories in the two decades following the Yugoslav disintegration.
Reconstruction of the “Montenegrin” Identity Schema: 
Identifi cation versus Diff erentiation
Eric Hobsbawm once drew an analogy between the role of history in nation-
alist movements and that of poppy fl owers in heroin use.26 Historical facts 
24. Federalni zavod za statistiku, Popis stanovništva 1981, 1991.
25. The split was triggered by Đukanović’s criticism of Milošević’s isolationist poli-
tics, but scholars have also noted the tension between the two factions of the DPS over 
control of the shadow market and assets accumulated during the early 1990s. For a de-
tailed discussion of the reasons for the split, see Morrison, Montenegro, and Morrison, 
“The Political Life of Milo Djukanović.”
26. Eric Hobsbawm, On History (London, 1997), 6.
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and events in and of themselves are largely detached from present-day re-
alities. They are raw material for nationalist ideologies, just like poppies for 
drug abuse. Hence, only when history has been processed and reproduced in 
national narratives do those events become a part of the way in which indi-
viduals see themselves in terms of belonging to a group and relating to other 
groups. Reference to past events becomes essential in the imagining of the 
nation because individuals build a sense of group continuity and affi  liation 
on the grounds of history. Three points are particularly relevant here and help 
diff erentiate the dynamics of identity and statehood in Montenegro from those 
of other former Yugoslav republics.
First, Montenegro’s small size has been a signifi cant factor in rearticu-
lating what it meant to be Montenegrin. Given that the country’s population 
amounts to only slightly more than six hundred thousand, the dynamics of 
sociopolitical organization there diff er from those in other post-Yugoslav re-
publics. Social relations are dense, due to the high degree of personal and 
family connections, which has commonly been related to the extremely high 
rates of party membership.27 The articulation of the Montenegrin schema be-
came particularly relevant in this regard aft er 1997, when the DPS-led coalition 
based a share of its grievances on the asymmetry of population and territory 
in the common state with Serbia.28 In turn, these grievances had greater reso-
nance with the people due to their strong affi  liations with political parties.
Second, throughout its history, identity in Montenegro has been dualistic: 
Serb and Montenegrin had not been mutually exclusive categories, a situation 
referred to as the Montenegrin homo duplex.29 This fact is particularly relevant 
for understanding the two competing streams of identity aft er Đukanović’s 
embrace of the independence project. Historically, affi  liation with Orthodox 
Christianity denoted association with the Serb category. Montenegrin rulers 
were at one time also the highest authority in the national Orthodox Church 
and were referred to as “prince-bishops” until the separation of the church 
from the state leadership in 1852. Thus, for several centuries religious and 
state rule emanated from a single nexus. This closeness, which became the 
core of the identity schema, resonated in the historical ambiguity over Monte-
negrin identity. In particular, the Petrović prince-bishops Petar I and Petar II 
referred to the population as “Serb,” which resulted in two distinct interpreta-
tions of identity in Montenegro that have persisted up to the present day—as 
Montenegrin and Serb.30
The conundrum created by religious affi  liation as to what Montenegrin 
27. Morrison, Montenegro; Morrison, “The Political Life of Milo Djukanović.”
28. International Crisis Group, “Montenegro’s Independence Drive,” Europe Re-
port, no. 169 (7 December 2005), at www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/balkans/
montenegro/169-montenegros-independence-drive.aspx (last accessed 1 February 2014).
29. Srdjan Darmanović, “Montenegro: Destiny of a Satellite State,” East European Re-
porter, no. 27 (March–April 1992): 28.
30. Cathie Carmichael and Nebojša Čagorović, “Constructing and Rethinking Mon-
tenegrin National Identity,” Narodna umjetnost: Hrvatski časopis za etnologiju i folkloris-
tiku, no. 1 (2006): 59–74; Jevtić, “Uloga religije u identitetu južnoslovenskih nacija,” in 
Godišnjak 2008. In addition to being prince-bishops, Petar I and Petar II are among the 
most notable literary fi gures in Montenegrin cultural history.
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identity meant has become an important aspect of the identity schema’s 
periphery in recent decades. In the early 1990s, due to the association of 
Montenegro’s ruling elites with the Serbian nationalist movement, prevail-
ing perceptions of the Montenegrin category were associated with (Serb) 
Orthodox Christianity.31 The tendency of the ruling elites to dissociate from 
(Serb) Orthodox Christianity as a prevalent marker of national identity was 
initiated aft er the party split in 1997. Due to the Đukanović camp’s need to at-
tract minority votes in order to ensure electoral victories, the reconstruction 
of the Montenegrin identity schema required detachment from the religious 
strand—which had been associated with animosity toward Islam and Roman 
Catholicism during the Yugoslav wars—and thus a detachment from the Serb 
 category.32 Hence, the Montenegrin identity schema became less ascriptive 
through religious affi  liation, as its boundaries expanded to include the adher-
ents of several religions.
Third, an important marker in the reconstruction of the meaning of be-
ing Montenegrin was diff erentiation through the tension between the history 
of Montenegro’s independent statehood and its membership in Yugoslavia. 
Throughout its history Montenegro existed as a separate, autonomous re-
gional entity, which, alongside Serbia, gained international recognition at 
the 1878 Congress of Berlin. In 1918 Montenegro joined Serbia in what became 
the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. In light of Brubaker’s theory, 
this could be regarded a major event that changed the nature of the identity 
schema, altering the cognitive frame through which categories of belonging 
were perceived. The kingdom, renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1928, 
functioned as a unitary state, detaching Montenegrin identity from the terri-
tory of Montenegro. In the fi rst Yugoslavia, national categories were related to 
the Serb, Croat, and Slovene “tribes,” a fact which has in recent years been re-
fl ected in the contested elements of identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mon-
tenegro, and Macedonia.33 These latter three constituent parts of Yugoslavia 
were recognized in the second, post-World War II Yugoslavia as separate re-
publics. Hence, Montenegrin identity developed within the Yugoslav federal 
frame, which since 1946 had acknowledged the existence of fi ve nations that 
for the most part lived within the borders of the constituent republics.34
The narrative of Montenegro’s independent statehood became more 
pronounced via the DPS’s mounting drive for independence aft er the fall of 
Milošević. It helped change the content of the Montenegrin and Serb identity 
categories. The Montenegrin identity involved the tendency to identify oneself 
with independent Montenegrin statehood in 2003 rather than 1991. The Serb 
identity came to stand for the preservation of the joint state with Serbia in 1991 
as well as in 2003. The diff erence in the content of Serb identity during these 
two time periods is that in 2003 it emphasized all elements that were related to 
31. Sabrina Ramet, “The Politics of the Serbian Orthodox Church,” in Ramet and 
Pavlaković, eds., Serbia since 1989, 255–85.
32. Bieber, “Montenegrin Politics since the Disintegration of Yugoslavia,” in Bieber, 
ed., Montenegro in Transition, 32.
33. Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia (Ithaca, 1984).
34. The constitution was amended in 1968, and Muslims as a group became recog-
nized as a constituent nation within the state.
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the union of Montenegro and Serbia. In 1991, by contrast, the drive for Monte-
negrin independence was rather weak and included only the Liberal Alliance 
of Montenegro (Liberalni Savez Crne Gore, LSCG) and minority parties, which 
comprised less than a quarter of the electorate.35 It is safe to assume that, 
aside from the very small share of people who supported Montenegrin inde-
pendence in 1991, interest in the preservation of the joint state with Serbia by 
default formed a part of both Montenegrin and Serb identities in 1991. Hence, 
those people whose identity was both Montenegrin and Serbian in 1991 (the 
homo duplex) likely related ethnic categories to their attitudes toward Monte-
negrin independence in 2003.
Institutionalized Nation Building: How “Montenegrin” Changed 
through Policies
The reconstruction of identity schemas does not occur in a vacuum. It is a 
product of a complex interaction between political and societal forces that act 
as sets of opportunities for and constraints on one another. In Montenegro 
the ruling political elites dominated the discourse related to the conception 
of the nation. The reconstruction of the Montenegrin schema’s meaning was 
initiated during the period of opposition to Milošević through policies that 
detached Montenegro from the federal institutions. These policies, which en-
tailed the establishment of separate customs, visa regulations, citizenship 
requirements, monetary policy, and the unilateral adoption of the deutsch-
mark as Montenegro’s offi  cial currency, have been referred to as “creeping 
independence.”36 The initial goal of the DPS’s “creeping independence” was 
neither independent statehood nor the institutionalization of a Montenegrin 
national identity. Rather, this set of policies served to support Đukanović’s 
separation from Milošević and to localize the political struggles between the 
DPS and the SNP.37
Yet, by 2000 this creeping independence had resulted in Montenegro’s 
high degree of detachment from the federal institutions. It provided a push 
for Đukanović’s turn toward independence aft er the fall of Milošević. In the 
period from 2001 to 2006, marked by tense political struggles between pro-
ponents and opponents of Montenegrin independence, the ruling DPS intro-
duced a further set of policies, aimed at reinforcing the independence idea 
by associating it with the Montenegrin schema. As the political camp led by 
the DPS consisted of ethnically heterogeneous groups, representations of a 
Montenegrin identity were based on the rhetoric of a “civic” nation—that is, 
the link with the state rather than with a community of like sentiment. Still, 
as indicated by survey results presented later in this article, these policies did 
35. International Crisis Group, “Current Legal Status of the Federal Republic of Yu-
goslavia (FRY) and of Serbia and Montenegro,” ICG Balkans Report, no. 101 (19 Septem-
ber 2000), at www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/Serbia%2012.pdf (last accessed 
5 February 2014).
36. Elizabeth Roberts, Serbia-Montenegro—A New Federation? (London, 2002), 6.
37. European Stability Initiative, Rhetoric and Reform: A Case-Study of Institution 
Building in Montenegro, 1998–2001 (Podgorica and Berlin, 28 June 2001), at www.esiweb.
org/index.php?lang=en&id=156&document_ID=16 (last accessed 5 February 2014).
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not result in a Montenegrin identity schema with a predominant association 
with the state instead of ethnic affi  liation. Rather, this schema was associated 
with affi  liation with political parties, predominantly the ruling DPS.38
However, the reconstruction of this Montenegrin schema involved more 
than political elements: the process entailed a separation from Serb ethnic 
identity. Several policies adopted by the DPS government aft er 2001 aimed at 
introducing ethnic elements into the identity schema. These policies, analyzed 
in the fi nal section of this article, are related to the reconstruction of nation-
hood through language and the symbols of the state. Another signifi cant ele-
ment of the policies that altered the meaning of the Montenegrin schema is 
the detachment of the ruling elites from the Serbian Orthodox Church, which 
they had largely supported in the early 1990s.39
Political Elements of Nation Building
The reconstruction of Montenegrin nationhood between 2001 and 2006 took 
place in a political environment marked by a tense struggle between par-
ties advocating and opposing the independence project. Identifi cation with 
a political party became a salient component of the Montenegrin and Serb 
schemas. In the 2011 survey, 68 percent of the respondents said they were af-
fi liated with a political party, and 73 percent of those who saw themselves as 
Montenegrin supported the ruling DPS. By contrast, respondents who consid-
ered themselves Serb tended to support the former members of the pro-union 
camp, represented by the SNP and the New Serb Democracy party (Nova srp-
ska demokratija, or NOVA)—42 percent and 34 percent, respectively)—whereas 
very little of the Montenegrin vote went to those parties (only 5 percent and 
1 percent to the SNP and NOVA, respectively). This is further confi rmation that 
the Montenegrin identity schema was reconstructed so as to align with the 
political program of the ruling DPS.
In addition to party affi  liation, identifi cation with the state is another po-
litical element in the reconstruction of the Montenegrin identity schema. Un-
like in countries with a predominantly civic identity, in Montenegro identifi ca-
tion with the state has a dual meaning. On the one hand, support for the state 
implies affi  liation with the political project of independence. Thus, 73 percent 
of those who saw themselves as Montenegrins identifi ed strongly with Mon-
tenegro, which is equivalent to the support of the Montenegrin category for 
the ruling DPS.40 Moreover, 95 percent of these respondents were proud to be 
citizens of their country.41 On the other hand, Montenegrin identity did not 
preclude the civic element in terms of respondents’ views on whether Monte-
negro is a multiethnic and multicultural country.
38. Ipsos Strategic Marketing, “Report: Nation Building—Montenegro,” 18.
39. Ramet, “The Politics of the Serbian Orthodox Church,” in Ramet and Pavlaković, 
eds., Serbia since 1989; Milorad Popović, Podijeljena nacija: Identitiet, država, vlast 
 (Cetinje, 2010); Šerbo Rastoder, Religija i politika 1991–1999: Pogled iz crnogorske per-
spective, at postjugo.fi lg.uj.edu.pl/baza/texts_display.php?id=98 (last accessed 5 Febru-
ary 2014).
40. Ipsos Strategic Marketing, “Report: Nation Building—Montenegro,” 102.
41. Ibid., 23.
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Figure 1. Identity and Party Support 
Sources. Computed on the basis of Ipsos Strategic Marketing, “Report: Nation Build ing—
Montenegro.”
The view of Montenegro as multiethnic and multicultural was supported 
by 75 percent of those who identifi ed themselves as Montenegrins.42 Aft er the 
political split in 1997, Đukanović’s DPS promoted the concept of civic identity 
in order to attract the minority vote pivotal to victory in the parliamentary 
elections of 1998, 2001, and 2002, and in the referendum on independence in 
2006. What became the Montenegrin identity schema—as promoted by the 
Đukanović camp—came to epitomize an umbrella concept of multicultural-
ism. However, this notion of multiculturalism was framed by tolerance of mi-
nority diff erences rather than true acceptance of diversity, as confi rmed by 
the fact that only 10 percent of those who identifi ed as Montenegrin believe 
that they have more in common with people of other ethnicities who live in 
their country than with anyone else of their own ethnic background.43 Yet the 
entrenchment of the rhetoric on Montenegro as a multiethnic and multicul-
tural state in the political program of the ruling elites has become an essential 
component of Montenegrin identity. The close correlations of the above data 
on the number of self-identifi ed Montenegrin supporters of the DPS (73 per-
cent), Montenegrin supporters of the state (73 percent), and Montenegrin sup-
porters of a multiethnic and multicultural conception of that state (75 percent) 
corroborate this claim.
Further political elements of Montenegrin identity were established at the 
time of the divide over statehood and identity and reinforced aft er the country 
became independent in 2006. These include attitudes toward military service, 
stances toward various international actors, and views on national holidays. 
Although these elements were initially at the periphery of the Montenegrin 
identity schema, by becoming politicized by the ruling elites as elements of 




Figure 2. Multicultural State and Support for the State
Sources. Computed on the basis of Ipsos Strategic Marketing, “Report: Nation Build ing—
Montenegro.”
negrin identity, as diff erentiated from the Serb one. However, they were some-
what less successful than the elements directly related to the ruling elites’ 
campaign for independence.
During the 1999 Kosovo crisis the Montenegrin authorities adopted a de-
cision to pardon conscripts who refused the federal call to fi ght in the war. 
This was intended to distance Montenegro from Milošević’s Serbia. The link 
between the state and military service was further highlighted in the 2002 
Belgrade Agreement, which stipulated that conscripts would be allowed to do 
military service in their member state, confi rming this policy through the con-
stitutional setup of the transformed joint state of Montenegro and Serbia. In 
both the second and the third Yugoslav governments, conscripts had served 
in a member state other than their own—a mechanism intended to foster a 
sense of loyalty to the federation rather than to their ethnic kin. In August 
2006, a few months aft er becoming an independent state, Montenegro abol-
ished conscription, a policy supported by 53 percent of those who identifi ed 
as Montenegrin and 34 percent of those who identifi ed as Serb.44 Part of the 
explanation for the limited public support for this policy lies in the histori-
cal narratives about Montenegro which highlight the militancy, “heroism and 
glory” of Montenegrins in their struggles against the Ottoman empire.45 Fur-
ther evidence to explain the partial support for this policy can be found in 
the high percentage of Montenegrins in the offi  cer corps of the Yugoslav Peo-
ple’s Army (Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija, JNA) and the more recent revival 
among Montenegrins of a warrior ethos and militancy in the wars of Yugoslav 
44. Ibid., 30.
45. Banac, National Question, 45–52.
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disintegration. According to Florian Bieber, it was the narrative of “heroism 
and glory,” coupled with the government’s war propaganda, that induced the 
“enthusiastic participation of the Montenegrin soldiers and reservists” in the 
JNA’s attacks on Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.46
As a consequence of these narratives and of the fact that Montenegro 
was closely aligned with Serbia in the early 1990s, supporting Milošević’s ex-
pansionist policies, we also fi nd polarized attitudes toward policies related 
to the issue of war crimes. Some 45 percent of self-identifi ed Montenegrins 
supported the apology for war crimes that President Đukanović made to Croa-
tia in 2000. Although not having majority support, the policy of apologizing 
for war crimes clearly demarcated those who identifi ed as Montenegrin from 
those who identifi ed as Serb, given that only 13 percent of the latter supported 
it.47 The data on people’s attitudes toward the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), cooperation with which is an offi  cial policy 
of Montenegro, are similar. While 46 percent of Montenegrins supported coop-
eration with the ICTY, only 13 percent of Serbs did so.48 Similarly, 30 percent of 
Serbs believed that working with the ICTY is negative for Montenegrin sover-
eignty, and an equal percentage saw this cooperation as harmful for Montene-
gro’s national interests. Only 13 percent of Montenegrins deemed the coopera-
tion with the ICTY damaging for the country’s sovereignty, while 11 percent of 
Montenegrins shared the belief that it would adversely aff ect national inter-
ests.49 Although these policies related to war crimes issues were not supported 
by an overwhelming majority of those who ascribe themselves to the Monte-
negrin schema, they show a clear split in attitudes between them and those 
who consider themselves Serbs. As these policies were adopted at the time 
of the divide over statehood and identity, their primary aim was to distance 
Montenegro from the federation and from Serbia. Gradually, however, by be-
ing included in the political aspect of the Montenegrin identity schema they 
became indicators of how groupism evolved in this small Balkan state.
The polarization created by creeping independence has also aff ected atti-
tudes toward the country’s foreign policy among those who saw themselves as 
Montenegrin. Aft er 1997 the ruling DPS oriented itself toward the west in order 
to receive fi nancial and logistical support in the struggle against Milošević. 
From 1997 to 2000 the United States and the EU gave Montenegro notable fi -
nancial assistance as “a tribute to the role being played by Montenegro in the 
eff ort to build a free and democratic Yugoslavia.”50 In subsequent years, and 
especially aft er the independence referendum, the ruling Montenegrin elites 
promoted EU integration as their main foreign policy objective.51 In this con-
46. Bieber, “Montenegrin Politics since the Disintegration of Yugoslavia,” in Bieber, 
ed., Montenegro in Transition, 18.
47. Ipsos Strategic Marketing, “Report: Nation Building—Montenegro,” 30.
48. Ibid., 40.
49. Ibid., 41.
50. Madeleine Albright, “U.S. Support for Democracy in Serbia and Montenegro,” re-
marks at U.S.-European Union-Serbian Opposition meeting in Berlin, Germany, 17 Decem-
ber 1999, U.S. Department of State Dispatch 10, no. 10 (December 1999): 1.
51. Dragan Đurić, “Montenegro’s Prospects for European Integration: On a Twin 
Track,” South-East Europe Review 79, no. 4 (2004): 79–105; Ministarstvo vanjskih poslova 
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Figure 3. Attitudes toward the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia
Sources. Computed on the basis of Ipsos Strategic Marketing, “Report: Nation Building—
Montenegro.”
text, although 69.9 percent of the surveyed Montenegrin population reported 
that they generally considered EU integration as a good thing, opinions to-
ward main foreign policy allies varied. Similar to the case of attitudes toward 
war crimes, these opinions have become another marker of the Montenegrin 
identity schema. Within this identity category, 40 percent of those surveyed 
saw the EU as the country’s main foreign policy ally, while the United States 
was cited by only 18 percent. This attitude is another marker of diff erentiation 
from the Serb schema, wherein only 13 percent and 10 percent saw the EU and 
the United States, respectively, as Montenegro’s main foreign policy allies. 
The majority of those who saw themselves as Serbs (53 percent) perceived 
their kin-state of Serbia as Montenegro’s main foreign policy ally, whereas 
only 20 percent of the self-identifi ed Montenegrins did so.52
Another politically shaped marker of the change in the identity schema 
in Montenegro is refl ected in attitudes toward state holidays. While Statehood 
Day (Dan državnosti), July 13, is regarded as the most signifi cant holiday in 
Montenegro by 40.1 percent of the overall population, which includes 43 per-
cent of those who identifi ed as Montenegrin and 38 percent of those who iden-
tifi ed as Serb, opinion was very divided as to Independence Day (Dan neza-
i evropskih integracija, “Spoljno-politički prioriteti Crne Gore,” at www.mvpei.gov.me/
ministarstvo/spoljno-politicki-prioriteti (last accessed 5 February 2014).
52. Ipsos Strategic Marketing, “Report: Nation Building—Montenegro,” 32.
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Figure 4. Main Foreign Policy Allies
Sources. Computed on the basis of Ipsos Strategic Marketing, “Report: Nation Building—
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visnosti), held May 21. The latter is considered to be the most important state 
holiday by 28.1 percent of the total survey sample, of which 39 percent of the 
Montenegrins and 8 percent of the Serbs reported holding this opinion.53 Such 
polarization regarding state holidays is related to the divide over statehood 
and identity and as such represents another political indicator of the Monte-
negrin identity schema’s reconstruction. Statehood Day is broadly supported 
because it marks the day Montenegrin statehood was recognized at the 1878 
Congress of Berlin. Moreover, on 13 July 1941 the people of Montenegro started 
their fi ght for liberation in WWII. Hence, it refers to two historical events and 
is interchangeably referred to as “Statehood Day” and “Rebellion Day.”54 By 
contrast, Independence Day marks the date of the 2006 referendum. As a con-
sequence of this association, and the victory of the DPS-led pro-independence 
camp (also rhetorically branded the pro-Montenegrin camp), this holiday is 
celebrated by 79 percent of those who identifi ed themselves as Montenegrin 
and only 23 percent of those who identifi ed as Serb.55
Therefore, the policies that have been adopted as a part of the DPS’s politi-
cal evolution since 1997 became entrenched in what was reportedly perceived 
by respondents as political or state-related aspects of the Montenegrin iden-
tity. These policies generate bifurcated opinions between those identifying 
themselves as Montenegrin and those as Serb, and thus they emerge as mark-
ers in the reconstruction of the post-Yugoslav Montenegrin identity schema.
53. Ibid., 27.
54. Miodrag Mališa Marović, Veljko Milatović (Podgorica, 2006).
55. Ipsos Strategic Marketing, “Report: Nation Building—Montenegro,” 27.
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Ethnicized Nation Building
The reconstruction of the meaning of Montenegrin has also entailed changes 
to those elements of the identity schema which are perceived as ethnocul-
tural. As a consequence of the split created in Montenegrin society by the 
divide over statehood and identity, the ruling elites adopted several symbolic 
policies in an attempt to consolidate their vision of independent statehood 
with that of a separate Montenegrin identity. The most signifi cant among 
these policies were those related to religion, state symbols, and language. The 
policies adopted with respect to each of these had diff erent backgrounds and 
goals, which can explain the diff ering degrees of popular support they have 
attracted. While the main aim of the religious policies has been to broaden the 
support for the DPS-led independence project, the policies on language and 
state symbols have been adopted predominantly as markers of diff erentiation 
between the Montenegrin and Serb identity schemas.
Religion in the Process of Identity Reconstruction
Aft er the fall of the socialist regime, religious identifi cation emerged as a pillar 
of the new identities across the Balkan region.56 The cases of Serbia, Croatia, 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the early 1990s are examples of how individu-
als’ self-ascription to a given religion served as an expression their national 
56. Ivan Krastev and Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Nationalism aft er Communism (Buda-
pest, 2004).
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positioning. Thus, religion became an important marker of the ethnonational 
identity schemas in the newly established post-Yugoslav states.
In the case of Montenegro, religious association as a by-product of politics 
(or, as Sabrina Ramet would term it, an “epipolitical phenomenon”), and not 
purely religious belief as such, became an identity marker.57 Throughout most 
of the 1990s the government of Montenegro supported the Serbian Orthodox 
Church (Srpska pravoslavna crkva, SPC). Yet, with the change in the politi-
cal landscape aft er 1997, the offi  cial policy of the ruling Montenegrin elites 
had been detachment from the SPC, aimed at ensuring broader support in the 
opposition to Milošević. With the quest for independence, this detachment 
intensifi ed, because the SPC insisted on Montenegrins’ “Serbian” origins and 
on the continuation of the joint state. The Serbian Orthodox Metropolitan 
of Montenegro and the Littoral declared that Serbia and Montenegro would 
separate only “once they separate[d] from their minds, from their memories, 
from their historical being, from the blood of their knights spilled in com-
mon battles, from their language, and from their religious knowledge [kada se 
odvoje od pameti, od svoga pamćenja, od svoga istorijskog bića, od krvi vitezova 
pomešane u svim bojevima, od svog jezika, od svog sabornog saznanja].”58 This 
stance of the SPC resonated strongly with members of the opposition bloc, 
who, according to polls, identifi ed primarily with this church.59 Conversely, 
the role of the church among supporters of the pro-independence DPS was 
not emphasized to the same extent. Supporters of the DPS, which advocated 
independent statehood in the 2006 Montenegrin referendum, oft en identifi ed 
themselves with the Serbian rather than the Montenegrin Orthodox Church 
(Crnogorska Pravoslavna Crkva, CPC).60 As an institutional epiphenomenon, 
the CPC challenged the religious domination of the SPC and provided a point 
of reference for those in the pro-independence camp who cherished religion 
as a part of their identity but did not want to identify with a church whose 
name included the term Serb. Moreover, since the Orthodox churches are “na-
tional” (autocephalous, not centralized worldwide), for some members of the 
pro-independence camp the existence of the CPC legitimized the separateness 
of Montenegrin identity and the quest for statehood.
The 2011 survey data show that more Montenegrins felt that the Montene-
grin rather than the Serbian Orthodox Church should be offi  cially recognized 
in Montenegro—47 percent versus 33 percent.61 In addition, 63 percent of those 
who self-identifi ed as Montenegrin believed that the authorities treat all the re-
57. Ramet, “The Politics of the Serbian Orthodox Church,” in Ramet and Pavlaković, 
eds., Serbia since 1989, 264.
58. “Mitropolit crnogorsko-primorski Amfi lohije za ‘Glas’ o ‘ratu’ crkava u Crnoj 
Gori: ‘Oblačak koji će proći,’” Glas Javnosti, 3 February 2002, at arhiva.glas-javnosti.rs/
arhiva/2002/02/03/srpski/I02020201.shtml (last accessed 5 February 2014).
59. Centre for Democracy and Human Rights (CEDEM), Public Opinion in Montenegro: 
January 2005 (Podgorica, 2005).
60. The CPC, established in 1993, was oft en described as the “epiphenomenon of 
Montenegrin politics.” Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias, 264. It operated as a para-legal in-
stitution before being registered as a non-governmental organization in January 2000.
61. Ipsos Strategic Marketing, “Report: Nation Building—Montenegro,” 48.
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Figure 6. Religion and Identity 
Sources. Computed on the basis of Ipsos Strategic Marketing, “Report: Nation Building—
Montenegro.”
ligious communities equally, as opposed to 33 percent of those who identifi ed 
as Serb.62 This lower degree of trust in the ruling government among the latter 
population is arguably a consequence of a series of policies that were directly 
related to the SPC. In 2005 the SPC unilaterally constructed a metal church on 
Mount Rumija, claiming that an Orthodox church had existed there until 1571. 
In 2009 the Montenegrin Ministry for Spatial Planning and Environmental 
Protection adopted a decree that this church should be demolished, a policy 
opposed by 37 percent of those who identifi ed as Montenegrin and 71 percent 
of those who declared themselves Serbs in the 2011 survey.63 In addition to 
representing a marker of polarization in terms of people’s identity, the ques-
tion of the church on Mount Rumija also resulted in a criminal complaint for 
hate speech fi led against the Serbian Orthodox Metropolitan of Montenegro 
and the Littoral, Amfi lohije, who issued a formal anathema against those 
who sought to demolish the church.64 This policy also indicates the change 
in the meaning of the Montenegrin identity schema and its detachment from 
the Serb one. In fact, 41 percent of those who reported seeing themselves as 
Montenegrin in the 2011 survey supported the criminal charges, in contrast to 
6 percent of those who declared themselves Serb.65
In addition to diff erentiating the categories of Serb and Montenegrin, the 
plethora of policies adopted by the government of Montenegro in relation 
62. Ibid., 47.
63. Ibid., 51.
64. Srđan Janković, “Amfi lohije bacio anatemu i za božićne praznike,” Radio Slo-
bodna Evropa, 10 January 2011, at www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/sve_amfi lofi jeve_
kletve/2271881.html (last accessed 1 March 2014).
65. Ipsos Strategic Marketing, “Report: Nation Building—Montenegro,” 52.
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to religion have ostensibly been inclusive toward the Bosniak community, 
79 percent of whose members identifi ed with Islam in religious terms.66 The 
responses to religion-related questions from those who declared themselves 
Bosniaks show a closer correlation with the category of Montenegrin than 
with that of Serb, with 29 percent supporting the demolition of the chapel 
on Mount Rumija and 44 percent supporting the criminal complaint against 
Metropolitan Amfi lohije for hate speech.67 Likewise, 96 percent of the sur-
veyed Bosniaks held that a Montenegrin may also be a Muslim, which indi-
cates that they generally perceive the Montenegrin identity category as being 
inclusive. However, the degree to which Montenegrin Muslims are accepted 
by non-Muslim Montenegrins was only 65 percent.68 This indicates that the 
religious inclusiveness of the Montenegrin schema promoted by the ruling 
elites attracted the support of the non-Orthodox community, while those who 
identifi ed as Christians remained divided as to whether the non-Orthodox liv-
ing in Montenegro could be considered Montenegrins.
How to Symbolize a Nation? State Symbols and Language as 
Elements of Diff erentiation
The implicit meanings of the symbols of a state, like the fl ag, the coat of arms, 
or the national anthem, have oft en been connected to the history of the people 
in question.69 And, indeed, symbols proved important in the reconstruction of 
the Montenegrin identity schema during the debate over statehood and iden-
tity. A law on Montenegrin national symbols was passed in 2004 that indi-
cated another push of the ruling elites toward independence. Article 4 of the 
2004 Law on State Symbols, also applied aft er independence, describes the 
coat of arms of Montenegro as “a golden-crowned double-headed eagle with 
its wings in fl ight, with a scepter in its right claw and an orb in its left , on a red 
base. On the eagle’s chest is a shield with a golden lion passant. The lion is on 
a green fi eld with a blue background. The crown above the eagle’s heads and 
the scepter are gold topped with a cross. The orb is blue with golden sheaths 
and cross.”70 As stipulated in Article 5 of the same law, the fl ag of Montenegro 
is to be red, bordered in gold, and with the coat of arms in the middle. The 
defi nitions of the symbols were subject to contestation among the political 
representatives and followers of the two blocs, a debate that is still ongoing 
in public discussions. In the 2011 survey, 90 percent of those who identifi ed 
themselves as Montenegrin approved of the offi  cial fl ag of Montenegro, as op-
posed to 39 percent of those who saw themselves as Serb.”71 The latter felt 
that a break with history had been made, as the traditional Montenegrin fl ag 
66. Ipsos Strategic Marketing, “Report: Nation Building—Montenegro,” 44. Please 
note that although there is also a national category of Muslims in Montenegro, the survey 
had not diff erentiated between Bosniaks and Muslims.
67. Ibid., 52.
68. Ibid., 49.
69. Mary Douglas, Implicit Meanings (London, 1975), 14.
70. “Zakon o državnim simbolima i Danu državnosti Crne Gore,” Službeni List Repub-
like Crne Gore, br. 47/04 (435.) od 12. srpnja 2004.
71. Ipsos Strategic Marketing, “Report: Nation Building—Montenegro,” 23–24.
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had been red, blue, and white, like the Serbian one, with a white eagle (also 
similar to the Serbian coat of arms).72 Moreover, the new Montenegrin fl ag 
was used by the pro-independence camp in the pre-referendum campaign, 
linking it closely to the Montenegrin identity schema. Consequently, in 2010 
the political parties representing the Serbs in Montenegro requested the re-
introduction of the tricolored fl ag.73
Article 6 of the same law identifi es the national anthem as “Oh, Bright 
Dawn of May” (“Oj, svijetla majska zoro”), a point that provoked a similar de-
gree of polarization among the people. The 2011 survey shows that 89 percent 
of those who identifi ed as Montenegrin liked the national anthem, as opposed 
to only 41 percent of those who declared themselves to be Serb.74 The anthem 
proved particularly divisive due to the association of two of its verses with 
the WWII Montenegrin nationalist movement, the Greens (Zelenaši), affi  liated 
with fascism and fascist Italy. The interwar leader of this movement, Sekula 
Drljević, composed two verses of the anthem, which are now controversial 
due to his authorship. Similar to the case of the national fl ag, Montenegro’s 
opposition parties—the SNP and NOVA—sought to have these lines deleted 
from the national anthem.75
Language has been an additional ethnocultural symbol in the reconstruc-
72. Miša Đurković, “Montenegro: Headed for New Divisions,” Confl ict Studies Re-
search Centre: Balkan Series 7, no. 9 (March 2007), 6.
73. Milena Milošević, “Fate of Montenegro’s State Symbols in Balance,” Balkan In-
sight, 26 April 2012, at www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/fate-of-montenegro-s-symbols-
still-uncertain (last accessed 5 February 2014).
74. Ipsos Strategic Marketing, “Report: Nation Building—Montenegro,” 25.
75. Milošević, “Fate of Montenegro’s State Symbols in Balance.”
Figure 7. Support for Language and Symbols
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tion of the Montenegrin identity schema. This question is inextricably related 
to the education system, the press, and the general transmission of ideas, as 
recognized by most of the academic work on nationalism and identity.76 In the 
Balkans, ever since the romantic idea of unifying the South Slavs emerged in 
the mid-nineteenth century, language has been an important aspect of how 
people viewed themselves.77 Especially aft er the events of the 1990s, language 
acquired a political dimension and became related to territory—to the “politi-
cal organization of space.”78 “Nationalizing” the language thus became one 
of the policies of the government of Montenegro.79
According to Article 9 of the 1992 Constitution of Montenegro, the “lan-
guage in offi  cial use” in Montenegro is the Ijekavski dialect of Serbian.80 Prior 
to Yugoslavia’s disintegration, the offi  cial language of the federation was Serbo-
Croatian. Both the Cyrillic and the Latin scripts, religiously, culturally, and po-
litically symbolizing the eastern (thus Christian Orthodox) and western (thus 
Catholic, or mixed) republics of Yugoslavia, respectively, were in use. Aft er the 
breakup of the federation, the successor states enshrined separate languages, 
named aft er the given state, in their constitutions, along with the corresponding 
script.81 In the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRJ), and in Montenegro, the of-
fi cial language remained Serbian. However, unlike the FRJ constitution, which 
gave clear precedence to Cyrillic (Article 15), the 1992 Constitution of Montene-
gro equalized the Cyrillic and the Latin scripts (Article 9). There are two reasons 
for Montenegro’s retention of the Serbian language and both scripts in 1992. 
First, the Montenegrin political elites were close to those in Serbia in the early 
1990s, which explains the use of the Serbian language in Montenegro during 
that period. The use of both scripts in Montenegro has been retained due to 
the particular ethnopolitical composition of the country and the cultural and 
historical signifi cance of both Cyrillic and Latin. Second, in none of the previ-
ous Yugoslav constitutions had the language been termed Montenegrin. It was 
natural to call the language Serbian, since the joint state continued to exist.
According to Article 13 of the 2007 Constitution of Montenegro, the “of-
fi cial language in Montenegro is Montenegrin,” with “Serbian, Bosnian, Al-
76. See Smith, National Identity; Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The In-
vention of Tradition (Cambridge, Eng., 1983); and John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State 
(Chicago, 1985).
77. George White, “Southeastern European Nationalism in Its Temporal and Spatial 
Context,” in White, Nationalism and Territory: Constructing Group Identity in Southeastern 
Europe (Oxford, 2000), 45–67.
78. White, Nationalism and Territory, 181.
79. Rajka Glušica, “Crnogorski jezik u čeljustima nacionalizma,” Riječ: Časopis za 
nauku o jeziku i književnosti, no. 4 (2010): 25–47; Cattaruzza, Territoire et nationalisme au 
Montenegro.
80. According to R. Aleksić, Pravopis srpskohrvatskoga književnog jezika: Sa pravo-
pisnim rečnikom (Novi Sad, 1960), Ijekavski is one of the three Serbian dialects (in addition 
to Ikavski and Ekavski). Ijekavski was predominantly spoken in Montenegro and Herze-
govina. The diff erence between the three stems from the modern pronunciation of the old 
Slavic letter Ѣ (jat), which is today pronounced “e,” “i,” or “je” or “ije.”
81. The Slovenian and Macedonian languages, which are linguistically diff erent from 
the former Serbo-Croatian language, offi  cially use Latin and Cyrillic scripts, respectively. 
The Croatian language offi  cially uses the Latin script exclusively, and the Serbian lan-
guage uses Cyrillic.
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banian, and Croatian” as “offi  cially used languages.”82 As recorded in the 
2003 census, 59.67 percent of the population claimed to speak Serbian, while 
21.53 percent listed their language as Montenegrin.83 In 2011, 42.88 percent of 
the people declared that their native language was Serbian and 36.97 percent 
that it was Montenegrin.84 Data from the 2011 survey show that 69 percent of 
those who declared themselves Montenegrin said they spoke Montenegrin: 
they used it in the census and in offi  cial documentation. This sharply distin-
guishes them from those who declared themselves Serb, 97 percent of whom 
said they used the Serbian language.85
In July 2009 Montenegro’s Ministry of Education and Science adopted 
new orthographic norms, according to which the Montenegrin alphabet now 
no longer has thirty graphemes but thirty-two (with the addition of ś and ź). 
Montenegro is the only former Yugoslav successor state to have altered its 
alphabet. This policy was supported by only 35.7 percent of the population: 
51 percent of the self-identifi ed Montenegrins and 4 percent of the Serbs.86 
82. “Ustav Crne Gore,” Službeni List Crne Gore, br. 1/07.
83. Zavod za Statistiku Crne Gore, “Population Census 2013,” at www.monstat.org/
cg/page.php?id=57&pageid=57 (last accessed 1 March 2014).
84. Zavod za Statistiku Crne Gore, “Population Census 2011.”
85. Ipsos Strategic Marketing, “Report: Nation Building—Montenegro,” 14. The issue 
of script was not covered in the survey.
86. Ibid., 59.
Figure 8. Loyalty Comparison in the Western Balkans 
Sources. Computed on the basis of Ipsos Strategic Marketing, “Report: Nation Building—
Montenegro.” 
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These fi gures suggest that the linguistic aspect of the Montenegrin identity 
schema’s reconstruction was less than successful, because a signifi cant per-
centage of those who identifi ed themselves as Montenegrin did not support all 
the government’s nation-building policies.
The dynamics of support for various policies adopted by the government 
of Montenegro is also refl ected in the loyalty index computed by the Political 
Science Research Centre (CPI) in Zagreb. Under the auspices of the “Symbolic 
Nation-Building in the West Balkans” project, the CPI constructed a loyalty 
index based on the responses to fourteen questions in the 2011 survey. The 
fourteen questions, each representing a loyalty variable across all seven for-
mer Yugoslav countries, were selected by the expert coding task group. The 
variables were selected to represent the individuals’ attitudes toward the state 
and those toward the state authorities’ offi  cial nation-building project. The 
variables were generated through questions based on which country the re-
spondents regarded as their homeland; whether they would live in that coun-
try for the rest of their lives or emigrate (two questions); whether they were 
proud to be the citizens of their country; which identity—civic or ethnic—was 
more important to them; whether the respondents approved of the country’s 
offi  cial fl ag and national anthem (two questions); whether they felt the au-
thorities’ policies and actions made them feel included and as though they 
belonged in the country, treated all ethnic and religious communities equally, 
and presented the country’s history in an accurate and appropriate way (four 
questions); whether any part of the country should be allowed to secede; and 
how the respondents evaluated the interethnic relations in their country at 
present and as compared to ten years prior (two questions). Responses to each 
question were coded as follows: 1 for full support (0.5 for partial support), 
–1 for full rejection (–0.5 for partial rejection), and 0 for neither support nor 
 rejection. Hence, the scale ranged from –14 to +14, with 0 as the neutrality 
point.
The overall loyalty score for Montenegro, presented in fi gure 8, stands at 
4.57—the second lowest in the western Balkans (though signifi cantly higher 
than the lowest, which was for Bosnia and Herzegovina, at 0.56). Although 
the CPI score places Montenegro closer to the other western Balkan states, 
which scored between 5.17 (Serbia) and 6.94 (Kosovo), there were signifi cant 
diff erences in support between the various ethnic groups.
As argued throughout this article, support for Montenegro’s offi  cial 
 nation-building policies has been professed by those who ascribe themselves 
to Montenegrin and Bosniak identity schemas. Figure 9 indicates the loyalty 
index of these two categories: 6.42 and 6.76, respectively. Interestingly, those 
who identify as Bosniak show slightly greater loyalty to the nation-building 
policies than those who see themselves as Montenegrin. This corroborates the 
interpretation that the ruling elite have pushed forward an inclusive agenda 
aimed specifi cally at attracting minority votes. By contrast, and unsurpris-
ingly, the loyalty score of those who identifi ed as Serb stands at –0.34, indicat-
ing that members of that category are not supportive of Montenegro’s offi  cial 
nation-building agenda. On the other hand, since the results for this group lie 
just below the neutrality point, it could also indicate that this population is 
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Figure 9. Loyalty Comparison by Ethnicity in Montenegro 
Sources. Computed on the basis of Ipsos Strategic Marketing, “Report: Nation Building—
Montenegro.”
likely to challenge some aspects of the dominant nation-building project, as 
in the case of the national symbols.87
The results of the censuses conducted aft er the Yugoslav breakup reveal 
a signifi cant change in the meaning of Montenegrin identity. Looking at na-
tional identity as an abstract category that is simultaneously cognitive and 
relational, this article has provided explanations for the opportunities and 
constraints that aff ected this identity change, in particular by focusing on 
the success of the nationalizing policies of the government of Montenegro. I 
began by proposing a theoretical framework for examining changes in Mon-
tenegrin identity and, using original quantitative data, followed up by inves-
tigating the reasons behind popular support for specifi c policies that helped 
change this identity.
The alterations to the Montenegrin identity schema were induced by the 
eff ects of the broader political environment in the post-Yugoslav space on the 
local competition for political power. As long as the ruling DPS elites sup-
ported Milošević’s politics, the Montenegrin identity schema remained closely 
87. Milošević, “Fate of Montenegro’s State Symbols in Balance.”
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related to that of Serbia. Aft er the split of the DPS in 1997, which triggered in-
ternal power struggles, the ruling elites adopted a series of policies aimed at 
distancing Montenegro from the FRJ institutions. Even though these policies 
did not initially have nation building as their main aim, they were integrated 
into the political aspects of the Montenegrin identity schema. The 2011 survey 
reveals sharp polarization between the Serb and Montenegrin categories in 
terms of attitudes toward the state, the ICTY, Montenegro’s foreign policy al-
lies, and political issues such as the apology to Croatia for war crimes. This 
indicates that the cognition of Montenegrin nationhood was changed by the 
alteration of a political frame—from closeness to Serbia to distancing and de-
tachment from it.
We have seen how the reconstruction of the meaning of being Montene-
grin was made possible due to the existence of historical narratives, which 
resonated in recent political discourse and were used to support or contest 
the claims of the two competing political camps. Historical ambiguity about 
national identity in Montenegro provided enough reference for the rival elites 
to fi nd historical justifi cations for their claims related to either independent 
Montenegrin statehood and separate Montenegrin identity or to the unifi ca-
tion with Serbia and the blurred lines between Serb and Montenegrin identi-
ties. Precisely because of these historical ambiguities, the ruling elite resorted 
to policies of nationalization aft er their turn toward independence. These pol-
icies were used to demarcate the Montenegrin identity category from the Serb. 
Policies on religion had a twofold aim. While separating the Montenegrin and 
Serb elements of identity through acceptance of the CPC, the Montenegrin 
ruling elite also sought to attract the non-Orthodox population to the cause 
of independence and therefore distanced themselves from the SPC. In conse-
quence, the Montenegrin identity schema became less related to religion.
The combination of political and ethnic elements in the Montenegrin 
identity schema induced a shift  in the cognition of what it means to be Mon-
tenegrin. This has had two implications. First, this process has dismantled 
the conjoined Montenegrin/Serbian homo duplex construct, largely through 
the nationalizing policies that served to demarcate the Montenegrin and Serb 
aspects of identity. Second, as the 2011 survey showed, the polarization of 
the populace into Montenegrin and Serb categories follows the identity di-
vide made clear in the 2003 and 2011 censuses. However, not all those who 
considered themselves Montenegrin in 1991 reported doing so in 2011, which 
indicates that ascription to identity categories is in fl ux.
Conceptually, the case of Montenegro helps us understand how individu-
als identify nationally by ascribing themselves to abstract communities, which 
they perceive as refl ective of communal bonds. The individuals’ perceptions 
of these communities can be altered if the frames for the cognition of national 
identities change through political action or broader social developments. 
The change in these frames does not change an individual’s ethnonational 
belonging. Rather, it transforms the content and the meaning of identity cat-
egories, the perception of what “a nation” stands for, thus allowing individu-
als to associate with or dissociate from it.
